o 


F 

1416 


0 

-I 


IE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  AND  SOME  INCIDENTAL  OBLIGA- 
TIONS IN  THE  ZONE  OF  THE  CARIBBEAN 


ADDRESS 

OF 

HON.  PHILANDER  C  KNOX 

BEFORE  THE 

YORK  STATE  BAR  ASSOCIATION 


NEW  YORK,  N.  Y.,  JANUARY  19,  1912 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  AND  SOME  INCIDENTAL  OBLIGA- 
TIONS IN  THE  ZONE  OF  THE  CARIBBEAN 


ADDRESS 


OF 


HON.  PHILANDER  C.  KNOX 


BEFORE  THE 


NEW  YORK  STATE  BAR  ASSOCIATION 


NEW  YORK,  N.  Y.,  JANUARY  19,  1912 


hPa»americana 

Washington,  D  c 
- 


enc 
dupjjcad08. 


Bancroft  L 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  AND  SOME  INCIDENTAL  OBLI 
GATIONS  IN  THE  ZONE  OF  THE  CARIBBEAN. 


Gentlemen  : 

When    I    was    invited    to    address    this 

distinguished    gathering    of    lawyers,    I    was 

very  glad   to  act   on   the   suggestion  that   I 

speak    to    you  on    the   subject  of    the    two 

^highly  important  conventions  now  awaiting 

^the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  as  the 

^coordinate  branch  of  the   executive  treaty- 

T^ 

D  making  power.  I  refer  to  the  conventions 
^negotiated  during  the  year  just  passed 
between  the  United  States  and  Honduras 
and  between  the  United  States  and  Nicara- 
gua, both  with  the  object  of  assisting  those 
two  Republics  to  work  out  their  own  best 
interests  and  to  achieve  prosperity  through 
their  own  efforts. 


Before  commending  to  your  attention 
these  two  conventions  I  wish  to  make  clear 
the  important  fact  in  their  favor  that  they 
respond  to,  and  indeed  actually  evidence,  one 
element  of  a  policy  initially  adopted  by  us 
for  our  guidance  in  international  affairs  almost 
a  century  ago,  and  since  then  repeatedly  an- 
nounced and  carried  out  by  successive  admin- 
istrations of  all  political  shades  and  beliefs. 
Involving  thus  a  question  of  international 
policy,  the  conventions  deserve  the  more 
attention  because  of  their  relations  to  the 
abstract  principles  of  international  law. 

Contiguous  countries,  or  those  approxi- 
mate by  reason  of  being  parts  of  one  of  the 
earth's  great  geographical  subdivisions,  sus- 
tain natural  and  inevitable  relations  toward 
each  other,  out  of  which  arise  certain 
political  correlations  to  be  asserted  from 
time  to  time  as  the  safety,  welfare,  and 
progress  of  the  group  as  a  whole,  or  that  of 


its  members,  may  require.  One  of  these 
relations  involves  the  necessity  of  being 
mindful  of  the  activities  of  other  states  and 
the  preservation  among  them  of  an  existing 
stable  status,  "whether,"  as  Phillimore  says, 
"by  preventing  the  aggressions  and  conquests 
of  any  one  power,  or  by  taking  care  that, 
out  of  the  new  order  of  things  produced 
by  internal  revolutions,  no  existing  power 
acquires  an  aggrandizement  that  may  menace 
the  liberties  of  the  rest  of  the  world". 

This  relation  and  the  necessities  arising 
out  of  it  are  doubtless  as  old  as  human  gov- 
ernment and  seem  certainly  to  have  become 
an  avowed  and  conscious  policy  so  soon 
as  there  existed  in  the  world  great  states 
in  rivalry  for  supremacy.  For  example, 
Hiero,  King  of  Syracuse,  though  an  ally  of 
Rome,  sent  aid  to  Carthage  during  the  war 
of  the  Auxiliaries;  and  Polybius  asserts  that 
the  King  justified  his  course  as  necessary — 


"both  in  order  to  retain  his  domin- 
ions in  Sicily,  and  to  preserve  the 
Roman    friendship,    that     Carthage 
should  be  safe;  lest  by  its  fall   the 
remaining    power     should    be    able, 
without  let  or  hindrance,  to  execute 
every  purpose  and  undertaking ff. 
Modern  nations  have  found  it  necessary 
to  invoke  and   enforce   the   same   principle, 
and  our  own  Government  very  early  in  its 
history  adopted   it  when   it  pronounced   the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  the  first  assertion  of  which 
was  based  on  purely  selfish  motives,  namely, 
that  this  country's  safety  and  peace  depended 
upon  the  exclusion  of  American  soil  as  a  field 
for  further  European  colonization. 

The  founders  of  our  Government  (ob- 
servers of  the  strifes,  turmoils,  and  rivalry 
among  the  countries  of  Europe)  very  early 
saw,  in  their  providential  wisdom,  the  neces- 
sity for  creating  and  maintaining  upon  this 


hemisphere  a  status  which  should  not  threaten 
the  existence  or  political  stability  of  this 
nation.  As  early  as  1  793  Jefferson  indi- 
cated in  an  instruction  to  the  American 
Minister  to  Spain  his  apprehensions  over  the 
further  acquisition  of  territory  on  this  conti- 
nent by  European  powers. 

A  few  years  later,  in  1  80 1 ,  Mr.   King, 
then  Minister  to  England,  reported  that  in  an 
interview  with    Lord    Hawkesbury  he  had 
indicated  that  the  United  States  were  "con- 
tented that  the  Floridas  remain  in  the  hands 
of  Spain,  but  should  not  be  willing  to  see 
them  transferred,  except  to  ourselves".     In 
1  808  President  Jefferson,  writing  to  Gov- 
ernor Claiborne,  of  Louisiana,  asserted  that — 
!We  shall  be  well  satisfied  to  see 
Cuba    and   Mexico  remain   in  their 
present  dependence ;  but  very  unwill- 
ing  to    see   them   in   that  of    either 
France  or  England,  politically  or  com- 


mercially.  We  consider  their  inter- 
ests and  ours  as  the  same,  and  that 
the  object  of  both  must  be  to  exclude 
all  European  influence  from  this  hem- 
isphere ". 

Three  years  later  President  Madison  sent 
to  Congress  a  secret  message  regarding  the 
occupation  of  the  Flondas,  in  response  to 
which  Congress,  in  secret  session,  passed  on 
January  15,  1811,  a  resolution  which  re- 
cited that — 

"Taking  into  view  the  peculiar 
situation  of  Spain,  and  of  her  Ameri- 
can provinces;  and  considering  the 
influence  which  the  destiny  of  the 
territory  adjoining  the  southern  border 
of  the  United  States  may  have  upon 
their  security,  tranquillity,  and  com- 
merce," resolved, 

"That  the  United  States,  under 
the  peculiar  circumstances  of  the 


existing  crisis,  can  not,  without  serious 
inquietude,  see  any  part  of  the  said 
territory  pass  into  the  hands  of  any 
foreign  power ;  and  that  a  due  regard 
to  their  own  safety  compels  them  to 
provide,  under  certain  contingencies, 
for  the  temporary  occupation  of  the 

*  1    i          *  •  ^       *        *         I! 

said  territory,  . 

These  few  antecedents  show  how  clearly 
this  principle  was  understood  by  and  how 
vividly  its  importance  was  impressed  upon 
the  founders  of  our  Government  and  how 
early  they  consciously  adopted  it  in  order  to 
secure  so  far  as  possible  from  outside  pressure 
the  preservation  of  the  Union.  Moreover, 
even  European  countries  not  only  recognized 
the  principle  itself  as  among  themselves,  but 
also  its  application  to  the  existing  political 
conditions  in  the  Americas.  In  the  corre- 
spondence between  Mr.  Rush  and  Mr.  Can- 
ning, as  a  result  of  which  at  least  in  part 


9 


President  Monroe  made  his  announcement, 
Mr.  Canning  in  a  letter  to  Mr.  Rush  under 
date  of  August  20,  1  823,  in  speaking  of  the 
Spanish  efforts  to  recover  control  of  her  col- 
onies, stated  the  following  propositions: 

1 1 .  We   conceive    the   recovery 

of    the    colonies    by    Spain    to    be 

hopeless. 


*  *  * 

if 


4.  We  aim  not  at  the  posses- 
sion of  any  portion  of  them  ourselves. 

"5.  We  could  not  see  any  por- 
tion of  them  transferred  to  any  other 
power  with  indifference. 

"  If  there  be  any  European  power 
which  cherishes  other  projects,  which 
looks  to  a  forcible  enterprise  for  re- 
ducing the  colonies  to  subjugation,  on 
behalf  of  or  in  the  name  of  Spain,  or 
which  meditates  the  acquisition  of 
any  part  of  them  to  itself,  by  cession 


10 


or  by  conquest,  such  a  declaration  on 
the  part  of  your  government  and  ours 
would  be  at  once  the  most  effectual 
and  the  least  offensive  mode  of  inti- 
mating our  joint  disapprobation  of 
such  projects." 

The  first  positive   pronouncement,  from 
which   has   grown,  in   the   lapse   of   fruitful 
years,  the  great  body  of  precept  and  prece- 
dent which  is  to-day  called  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, is  found  in  President  Monroe's  annual 
message  of  1823,  in  which  he  stated  that — 
"The  occasion  has  been  judged 
proper  for  asserting  as  a  principle  in 
which  the  rights  and  interests  of  the 
United  States  are  involved,  that  the 
American  continents  by  the  free  and 
independent    condition    which   they 
have    assumed   and    maintained    are 
henceforth  not  to  be   considered  as 
subject  for  future  colonization  by  any 
European  powers". 


11 


This  statement  was  designed  as  a  politic 
declaration,  made  to  fit  a  specific  "occasion", 
namely,  the  claim  of  Russia,  under  the  ukase 
o£J  82 1 ,  to  exclude  all  alien  commerce  and 
industry  from  the  coasts  and  waters  of  north- 
western America  down  to  the  fifty-first  par- 
allel. John  Quincy  Adams,  then  Secretary 
of  State,  resisted  this  avid  claim  on  the 
ground  that  no  Russian  settlement  existed  on 
the  territory,  to  which  the  United  States  laid 
equal  claim,  and  on  July  17,  1823,  more 
than  five  months  before  President  Monroe's 
message,  Mr.  Adams  gave  notice  to  the 
Russian  envoy  to  the  effect  that  the  flaw  in 
the  Russian  contention  could  not  be  cured 
by  making  settlements,  as  an  afterthought,  to 
prop  up  an  unjustified  claim  of  title.  What 
Mr.  Adams  said  was — 

"that  we  [the  United  States]  should 
contest  the  right  of  Russia  to  any 
territorial  establishment  on  this  con- 

12 


tinent,  and  that  we  should  assume 
distinctly  the  principle  that  the 
American  continents  are  no  longer 
subjects  for  any  new  European  colo- 
nial establishments". 

It  was  this  categorical  declaration  that 
Monroe  embodied  in  his  message,  with  the 
verbal  change  that  the  original  "settlements", 
which  under  Mr.  Adams's  pen  became  "  ter- 
ritorial establishments"  and  "colonial  estab- 
lishments", was  altered  to  "future  coloniza- 
tion". Thus  amended,  the  Adams  caveat, 
directed  specifically  at  the  Russian  claim,  be- 
came in  time  merged  in  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine proper  and,  a  generation  later,  played 
its  part  in  the  negotiation  of  the  Central 
American  and  Clayton-Bulwer  treaties  with 
Great  Britain  as  a  question  of  fact,  resting 
on  the  assertion  that  the  continent  was  "occu- 
pied by  civilized  independent  nations"  and 
was  "  accessible  to  Europeans  and  each  other 
on  that  footing  alone ". 


13 


The  Monroe  Doctrine  proper,  as  enun- 
ciated in  a  different  part  of  the  celebrated 
message  of  1 823,  was  much  more  far- 
reaching.  It  was  called  forth  by  the  menace 
of  a  combination  of  European  powers  with 
the  purpose  of  interference  in  the  political 
affairs  of  the  recently  enfranchised  American 
republics,  whose  sovereign  existence  had 
been  acknowledged  by  the  United  States 
but  not  then  by  Europe.  This  movement, 
an  outgrowth  of  the  Holy  Alliance  of  1815 
and  originally  confined  to  Europe  as  a 
league  for  protecting  the  principle  of  legiti- 
macy as  against  revolution,  for  upholding 
the  divine  right  of  kings  as  opposed  to  the 
rights  of  the  people,  was  extended,  in  the 
summer  of  1823,  to  embrace  intervention, 
in  behalf  of  Spanish  sovereignty,  in  America. 
France  proposed  to  Great  Britain  that  when 
the  allies  should  have  accomplished  their 
task  of  restoring  the  Spanish  Throne,  they 


14 


should  propose  a  congress  with  the  view  to 
the  termination  of  the  revolutionary  govern- 
ments in  Spanish  America;  but  England 
looked  upon  this  proposal  with  disfavor,  and 
Canning,  late  in  the  summer  of  1823, 
sounded  the  United  States  as  to  the  pos- 
sibility of  the  two  Governments  taking  a 
joint  position  against  interference  by  the 
allies  in  Latin  America.  The  opinion  of 
Jefferson  that — 

"Our    first  and  fundamental  maxim 
should    be    never    to    entangle    our- 
selves in  the  broils  of  Europe;  our 
second,  never  to  suffer  Europe  to  in- 
termeddle with  cis- Atlantic  affairs fl — 
was  echoed  by  Monroe's  advisers.     The  sug- 
gestion of    joint   action  with   Great  Britain 
was  not  favored,  but  the  coincidence  of  Brit- 
ish   policy   with   our  own  was  not    unwel- 
come.    England,  indeed,  took  the  initiative 
in  October,  1823,  by  declaring  that,  while 


15 


neutral  as  to  the  contest  between  Spain  and 
her  American  colonies,  the  "junction"  of 
any  foreign  power  with  Spain  against  the 
colonies  would  be  viewed  as  constituting 
"entirely  a  new  question  upon  which  Great 
Britain  must  take  such  decision  as  her  inter- 
ests required".  The  Canning  declaration 
was  potential  and  was  soon  rendered  specifi- 
cally effective  by  the  utterance  of  Monroe; 
the  fact  that  the  two  great  maritime  Powers 
were  moving  in  parallels  toward  the  enuncia- 
tion of  a  vital  principle  made  impracticable 
the  accomplishment  of  any  project  of  Amer- 
ican interference  by  the  allies,  and  they  were 
not  slow  to  realize  the  force  of  Monroe's 
announcements  when  he  said: 

!We  owe  it,  therefore,  to  candor 
and  to  the  amicable  relations  existing 
between  the  United  States  and  those 
powers,  to  declare  that  we  should 
consider  any  attempt  on  their  part  to 

16 


extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of 
this  hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our 
peace  and  safety.  With  the  existing 
colonies  or  dependencies  of  any  Euro- 
pean power,  we  have  not  interfered 
and  shall  not  interfere.  But  with 
the  governments  who  have  declared 
their  independence  and  maintained 
it,  and  whose  independence  we  have, 
on  great  consideration  and  on  just 
principles,  acknowledged,  we  could 
not  view  any  interposition  for  the 
purpose  of  oppressing  them  or  con- 
trolling in  any  other  manner  their 
destiny,  by  any  European  power,  in 
any  other  light  than  as  the  manifes- 
tation of  an  unfriendly  disposition 
toward  the  United  States." 
Like  all  general  formulations  of  great 
principles  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  required 
interpretation  and  construction  to  apply  its 
precepts  to  special  cases. 


17 


It  was  understood  at  the  outset  by  the 
newly  enfranchised  Latin- American  States  as 
a  defensive  movement  in  their  favor,  rather 
than  as  a  step  taken  by  the  United  States  in 
its  own  interest  and  for  its  own  self-defense. 
In  1825  the  southern  republics  proposed  to 
convene  a  congress  at  Panama  to  form  an 
alliance  of  all  the  independent  American 
States  for  self-defense  and  to  settle  some 
principle  of  public  law  to  govern  their  rela- 
tion with  each  other.  One  of  the  measures 
scheduled  for  discussion  was: 

!To  take  into  consideration  the 
means  of  making  effectual  the  declara- 
tion of  the  President  of  the  United 
\ 

States  respecting  any  ulterior  design 
of  a  foreign  power  to  colonize  any 
portion  of  this  continent,  and  also  the 
means  of  resisting  all  interference 
from  abroad  with  the  domestic  con- 
cerns of  the  American  Governments." 

18 


It  thus  appears  that  the  Spanish- American 
States  understood  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to 
import  a  definite  pledge  by  the  United  States 
to  them  of  mutual  support  in  its  maintenance 
and  to  involve  joining  with  them  in  some 
kind  of  specific  alliance,  offensive  and  defen- 
sive, for  that  purpose.  The  Senate  responded 
to  the  proposal  for  a  congress  by  confirming 
two  commissioners,  for  whose  expenses  the 
Congress  appropriated  means;  but  one  of 
them  died,  the  other  reached  Panama  too 
late  to  take  part  in  the  first  session,  and  no 
second  session  was  ever  held. 

In  1 848  President  Polk  saw  occasion 
for  an  expansive  construction  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  An  Indian  rising  in  Yucatan  led 
the  local  authorities  to  offer  their  dominion 
and  sovereignty  to  the  United  States,  and, 
perhaps  on  the  principle  of  having  more  than 
one  string  to  their  bow,  to  make  a  like  offer  to 
England  and  Spain.  Commenting  on  this 
offer,  Mr.  Polk  said: 

19 


"According    to    our    established 
policy,  we  could   not   consent   to  a 
transfer  of  this  'dominion  and  sover- 
eignty1 to  either  Spain,  Great  Britain, 
or  any  other   European  power.     In 
the  language  of  President  Monroe,  in 
his  message  of  December,  1  823,  fwe 
should  consider  any  attempt  on  their 
part   to  extend  their  system   to  any 
portion  of  this  hemisphere  as  danger- 
ous to  our  peace  and  safety.1 ' 
In  this  message  Polk  practically  repeated 
what    he  had  said    in    1 845  in  connection 
with  the  Oregon  boundary  question  and  the 
annexation  of  Texas,  when  he  deemed — 

"that  it  should  be  distinctly  an- 
nounced to  the  world  as  our  settled 
policy,  that  no  future  European  col- 
ony or  dominion  shall,  with  our  con- 
sent, be  planted  or  established  on 
any  part  of  the  North  American 
continent ". 

20 


Thus,  President  Polk  merged  the  "non- 
colonization"  declaration  of  Mr.  Adams  in 
the  case  of  the  Russian  claim  with  the  true 
Monroe  Doctrine  of  political  noninterference. 
This  combined  doctrine  found  early  ap- 
plication in  the  case  of  Cuba.  As  early  as 
in  President  Jackson's  time  it  was  intimated 
by  us  to  Spain  "that  if  she  would  not  cede 
Cuba  to  any  European  power  we  would 
assist  her  in  maintaining  possession  of  it". 
As  Secretary  of  State,  Daniel  Webster  took 
occasion  to  revive  this  phase  of  the  broad- 
ened doctrine  by  serving  notice  in  1851 
upon  Great  Britain,  in  view  of  a  proposed 
tripartite  engagement  between  France,  Great 
Britain,  and  Spain  to  guarantee  the  Spanish 
retention  of  Cuba,  that — 

"  it  has  always  been  declared  to  Spain 
that  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  could  not  be  expected  to 
acquiesce  in  the  cession  of  Cuba  to 
an  European  power". 

21 


Thenceforth,  through  the  period  of  the 
Ostend  manifesto  and  the  time  when  Mr. 
Marcy  was  Secretary  of  State,  and  Cuban 
annexation  to  the  United  States  was  dis- 
cussed, Cuba  passed  on  to  independence  and 
finally  to  its  present  position  of  great  potential 
well-being,  securely  bulwarked,  by  definite 
stipulations,  from  ever  again  becoming  an 
issue  under  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  To-day 
no  great  liveliness  of  imagination  is  needed^ 
to  conjecture,  in  retrospect,  whither  the  Pearl 
of  the  Antilles  might  have  drifted  but  for  the 
part  taken  by  the  United  States  in  securing 
Cuba  for  the  Cubans. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  also  came  peril- 
ously near  being  brought  into  direct  play 
when,  during  our  Civil  War,  Spain  made 
an  attempt  to  regain  Santo  Domingo 
through  an  illegal  arrangement  with  its 
President  for  the  time  being.  The  scheme 
was  abortive,  but  the  causes  which 


22 


prompted  it  survived,  and  the  Dominican 
Republic  continued  to  suffer  from  impotent 
misrule,  financial  default,  and  civil  pertur- 
bation. Conspicuously  an  easy  prey  to  any 
aggression  from  abroad,  it  sought  the  formal 
protection  of  the  United  States,  which  was 
declined.  It  then  voluntarily  sought  annex- 
ation, which  was  accepted  and  a  treaty  to 
that  end  was  negotiated  but  never  consum- 
mated. In  sending  the  treaty  to  the  Senate, 
President  Grant  said: 

"The  doctrine  promulgated  by 
President  Monroe  has  been  adhered 
to  by  all  political  parties,  and  I  now 
deem  it  proper  to  assert  the  equally 
important  principle  that  hereafter  no 
territory  on  this  continent  shall  be 
regarded  as  subject  of  transfer  to  a 
European  power. 

"The  acquisition  of  San  Do- 
mingo is  an  adherence  to  the  fMon- 


23 


roe    Doctrine1;    it   is  a   measure   of 
national  protection." 

We  thus  see  President  Grant  ready  to  agree 
to  annexation  if  the  alternative  bid  fair  to  be 
the  stultification  of  our  long-asserted  right 
and  duty  of  self-preservation  against  adverse 
influences  being  set  up  through  un-American 
domination  at  our  doors. 

To  illustrate  how  the  self-preservation 
features  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  have  been 
espoused  and  lived  up  to  by  all  of  our 
national  administrations,  whatever  their  party 
allegiance  or  political  creed,  as  well  as  to 
show  the  association  between  the  instinct  of 
self-preservation  and  the  idea  of  aiding  our 
neighbors  to  guard  themselves  against  in- 
vasive alien  influences  from  which,  in  the 
end,  we  ourselves  should  suffer,  the  Vene- 
zuelan episode  of  1  895  may  be  pertinently 
cited.  On  its  face,  the  issue  between  Vene- 
zuela and  Great  Britain  was  merely  one  of 


24 


determining  an  undefined  boundary  line;  in 
its  essence,  it  appeared  to  involve  the  setting 
up  of  expanded  colonial  domination  by  Great 
Britain  over  a  large  part  of  the  historical  terri- 
tory of  Venezuela.  The  dispute  lasted  nearly 
half  a  century.  Mr.  Evarts,  Mr.  Freling- 
huysen,  and  Mr.  Bayard  successively  urged 
upon  Great  Britain  the  acceptance  of  the 
arbitration  asked  by  Venezuela.  Mr.  Blaine 
followed  in  1  889,  after  Barima,  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Orinoco,  had  been  proclaimed  a 
British  port.  When  Mr.  Cleveland  assumed 
office,  Mr.  Olney  renewed  the  appeal  for 
arbitration  with  the  alternative  of  conven- 
tional agreement  upon  a  definite  boundary. 
In  February,  1895,  Congress,  by  joint  reso- 
lution, approved  the  President's  recommen- 
dation of  arbitration.  On  July  20,  1895, 
Mr.  Olney  addressed  to  Ambassador  Bayard 
an  instruction  which  has  become  one  of  the 
famous  papers  of  our  diplomatic  annals.  He 


25 


asserted  that  the  right  of  one  nation  to  inter- 
vene in  a  controversy  to  which  other  nations 
are  directly  parties  may  be  availed  of  "  when- 
ever what  is  done  or  proposed  by  any  of  the 
parties  primarily  concerned  is  a  serious  and 
direct  menace  to  its  own  integrity,  tranquil- 
lity, or  welfare". 

He  elaborately  analyzed  the  history  and 
scope  of  the  doctrine  of  Monroe,  especially 
dwelling  upon  its  noncolonization  declara- 
tion, deducing  "that  the  Venezuelan  bound- 
ary dispute  is  in  any  view  far  within  the 
scope  and  spirit  of  the  rule  as  uniformly 
accepted  and  acted  upon ".  He  was  careful 
not  to  link  himself  to  the  cause  of  either 
disputant.  To  quote  only  very  briefly,  he 
said  that  the  United  States  "being  entitled 
to  resent  and  resist  any  sequestration  of 
Venezuelan  soil  by  Great  Britain,  it  is  neces- 
sarily entitled  to  know  whether  such  seques- 
tration has  occurred  or  is  now  going  on". 


26 


•  Mr.  Olney's  conclusion  was  that  it  ap- 
peared to  be  the  unmistakable  and  impera- 
tive duty  of  the  President  to  ask  "for  a 
definite  decision  upon  the  point  whether 
Great  Britain  will  consent  or  will  decline  to 
submit  the  Venezuelan  boundary  question  in 
its  entirety  to  impartial  arbitration". 

The  dispute  was  eventually  and  happily 
ended  by  arbitration. 

It  was  at  this  period  of  the  development 
of  the  doctrine  and  in  this  very  controversy 
that  a  new  suggestion  was  made,  in  negative 
form,  to  the  effect  that  if  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  had  the  rights  which  it 
claimed,  it  must  take  them  cam  onere  and  so 
assume  certain  obligations  and  responsibili- 
ties. This  was  indicated  by  Lord  Salisbury 
in  answer  to  Mr.  Olney's  able  presentation 
of  the  doctrine  in  the  statement  that — 

"It  is  admitted  that  he  [President 
Monroe]  did  not  seek  to  assert  a  pro- 


27 


tectorate  over  Mexico  or  the  states  of 
Central  and  South  America.  Such 
a  claim  would  have  imposed  upon 
the  United  States  the  duty  of  answer- 
ing for  the  conduct  of  these  states, 
and  consequently  the  responsibility  of 
controlling  it.  It  follows 

of  necessity  that  if  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  will  not  control 
the   conduct  of    these    communities, 
neither  can  it  undertake  to  protect 
them  from  the  consequences  attach- 
ing to  any  misconduct  of  which  they 
may  be  guilty  towards  other  nations". 
In  this  relation  I  am  disposed  to  empha- 
size the  fact  that  our  course  in  the  Vene- 
zuelan   incident,    apart    from    obeying    the 
instinct    of    self-preservation,  was    distinctly 
and  mainly  responsive  to  the  appeal  of  Vene- 
zuela and  in  the  direction  of  lending  a  help- 
ful hand  to  a  suffering  neighbor  to  enable  a 


28 


just  determination  of  her  asserted  claim  of 
right.  So  far  as  Venezuela  was  concerned 
we  imposed  no  burden  upon  that  then  feeble 
State;  we  simply  assisted  it  to  throw  off  a 
burden.  It  was  surely  zeal  in  the  defense 
of  a  sister  Republic  and  unaffected  conscious- 
ness that  our  power  was  for  beneficent  use 
which  called  from  Mr.  Olney  these  vigorous 
words : 

1  To-day  the  United  States  is 
practically  sovereign  on  this  conti- 
nent and  its  fiat  is  law  upon  the 
subjects  to  which  it  confines  its 
interposition." 

The  spirit  behind  these  words  contem- 
plated, I  am  sure,  no  arbitrary  exercise  of 
sheer  power,  but  a  determined  zeal  in  mag- 
nanimous consideration  for  the  rights  of  other 
American  Republics,  a  sincere  sympathy 
with  them  in  their  trials,  an  insistence  upon 
the  right,  that  good  might  come  to  them  and 

29 


that  our  own  vital  interests  should  not  be 
menaced. 

It  goes  almost  without  saying  that,  from 
aiding  an  embarrassed  neighbor  in  doing  the 
right,  or  in  defending  a  right,  to  assuming 
vicarious  responsibility  for  his  wrongdoing,  is 
a  far  cry.  Between  these  two  extremes,  as 
between  all  extremes,  there  lies  a  median 
zone  where  they  touch  or  even  overlap. 
That  is  the  case  when  the  question  arises 
how  far,  in  a  given  situation,  this  nation 
may  go  in  helping  another  American  peo- 
ple to  avert  any  injurious  consequences  of 
wrongdoing. 

In  principle  it  is  not  the  duty  of  the 
United  States  to  prevent  a  foreign  state  from 
seeking  redress,  or  to  shoulder  the  wrong 
and  assume  its  redress  ourselves.  But  it  is 
equally  obvious  that  the  measures  to  which 
a  foreign  state  might  ordinarily  resort  to  en- 
force its  claim  might  amount  to  political 


30 


interference  in  the  affairs  of  the  American 
continents,  as  by  occupation  and  administra- 
tion of  territory,  or  like  extreme  coercive  steps. 
That  is  a  contingency  which  the  tenets  of 
the  doctrine,  joined  to  the  dictates  of  com- 
mon prudence,  authorize  and  counsel  us  to 
avert  by  all  proper  means,  in  fulfillment  of  a 
responsibility  we  owe  to  ourselves,  even  if 
not  in  the  discharge  of  any  conventional  or 
moral  obligation. 

The  point  was  well  considered  in  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt's  annual  message  of  1905. 
He  examined  it  in  its  tortious  and  contractual 
aspects.  As  to  the  former,  he  said: 

"  If  a  republic  to  the  south  of  us 
commits  a  tort  against  a  foreign 
nation,  such  as  an  outrage  against  a 
citizen  of  that  nation,  then  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  does  not  force  us  to 
interfere  to  prevent  punishment  of  the 
tort,  save  to  see  that  the  punishment 


31 


does  not  assume  the  form  of  territorial 
occupation  in  any  shape." 

As  to  the  latter  aspect,  he  said: 

11  On  the  one  hand,  this  country  would 
certainly  decline  to  go  to  war  to  pre- 
vent a  foreign  government  from  col- 
lecting a  just  debt;  on  the  other 
hand,  it  is  very  inadvisable  to  permit 
any  foreign  power  to  take  possession, 
even  temporarily,  of  the  custom- 
houses of  an  American  Republic  in 
order  to  enforce  the  payment  of  its 
obligations;  for  such  temporary  occu- 
pation might  turn  into  a  permanent 
occupation." 

And  upon  both  propositions  he  reached  the 

conclusion  that — 

!The  only  escape  from  these  alter- 
natives may  at  any  time  be  that  we 
must  ourselves  undertake  to  bring 
about  some  arrangement  by  which  so 

32 


much  as  possible  of  a  just  obligation 

shall   be  paid.     It  is  far   better  that 

this  country  should  put  through  such 

an   arrangement,   rather    than    allow 

any  foreign  country  to  undertake  it". 

My  distinguished  predecessor,  Mr.  Root, 

voiced  the  same  views   in  a  speech  made 

in  1 904  at  the  annual  dinner  of  the  New 

England  Society: 

"And  if  we  are  to  maintain  this 
doctrine  [the  declaration  of  Monroe], 
which  is  vital  to  our  national  life  and 
safety,  at  the  same  time  when  we  say 
to  the  other  powers  of  the  world, 
1  You  shall  not  push  your  remedies  for 
wrong  against  these  republics  to  the 
point  of  occupying  their  territory/ 
we  are  bound  to  say  that  whenever 
the  wrong  can  not  be  otherwise  re- 
dressed we  ourselves  will  see  that  it 
is  redressed." 

33 


These,  gentlemen,  constitute  the  more 
important  announcements,  with  the  elements 
involved  therein,  which  have  been  made  dur- 
ing our  past  history,  and  whatever  particular 
phase  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  you  may 
choose  to  emphasize,  it  appears  to  me  evident 
that  there  is  one  certain  deduction  from  the 
premises,  and  that  is  that  the  best  way  to 
avoid  the  difficulties  occasionally  arising  out 
of  any  responsibilities  which  this  doctrine  in 
certain  of  its  aspects  may  seem  to  impose  is 
to  assist  the  less  fortunate  American  Repub- 
lics in  conducting  their  own  affairs  in  such 
a  way  that  those  difficulties  should  not  be 
liable  to  arise.  The  most  effective  way  to 
escape  the  logical  consequences  of  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  is  to  help  them  to  help  them- 
selves. Assuming  the  correctness  of  Mr. 
Root's  corollary,  it  is  our  duty,  to  ourselves 
and  to  them,  to  cooperate  in  preventing, 
where  possible,  specific  conditions  where  we 


34 


might  have  to  become  in  too  great  a  measure 
accountable.  We  diminish  our  responsibili- 
ties in  proportion  as  we  bring  about  improved 
conditions.  Like  an  insurance  risk,  our  risk 
decreases  as  the  conditions  to  which  it 
pertains  are  improved. 

I  most  confidently  assert  that,  under  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  in  its  ultimate  analysis,  the 
.  heaviest  and  most  matter-of-fact  responsi- 
bility that  to-day  rests  upon  the  United 
States  is  that  we  should  respond  to  the  needs 
still  .felt  by  some  few  of  our  Latin- American 
neighbors  in  their  progress  toward  good  gov- 
ernment, by  assisting  them  to  meet  their  just 
obligations  and  to  keep  out  of  trouble.  We 
wish  to  see  them  prosper,  and  their  prosper- 
ity, by  reflex  action,  is  felt  not  only  by  us 
but  by  all  the  members  of  the  American 
family. 

The  proposition  is  not  novel;  it  has 
been  practically  wrought  into  shape  and 


35 


proved  successful  in  the  experimental  case 
of  Santo  Domingo,  which,  as  we  have  seen, 
had  begun  to  cause  us  concern  so  long  ago 
as  the  time  of  our  Civil  War.  The  success 
of  the  Dominican  arrangement  has  been  so 
brilliant  that  I  mention  it  at  some  length  as 
the  best  possible  guaranty  of  the  good 
effects  to  be  expected  from  the  Nicaragua 
and  Honduras  conventions,  which  are  similar 
in  principle  but  necessitate  an  even  less 
direct  interposition  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States. 

In  1 904  the  Dominican  Republic  pre- 
sented a  situation  which  threatened  to  lead 
to  the  gravest  consequences  so  far  as  the 
United  States  was  concerned.  For  years 
the  country  had  been  torn  by  internal  dis- 
sension and  revolutions  until  the  instability 
of  the  so-called  Government  had  become  a 
byword  and  the  credit  of  the  nation  had 
been  reduced  to  such  a  condition  that 

36 


usurious  rates  of  interest  were  demanded  and 
obtained  by  those  who  were  willing  to 
furnish  the  tottering  Republic  with  funds. 
It  was  also  customary  for  the  lenders  of 
money  to  demand  as  security  for  the  pay- 
ment of  interest  and  principal  the  hypothe- 
cation of  the  revenues  of  the  various  sea- 
ports of  the  country  until  at  length  the 
Dominican  people  found  themselves  in  a 
position  where  practically  the  revenues  of 
every  port  in  the  Republic  were  pledged  for 
the  payment  of  debts.  There  were  no  funds 
left  wherewith  to  maintain  the  Government, 
the  total  revenues  from  imports  and  exports 
had  for  years  been  insufficient  to  meet  even 
the  interest  on  the  outstanding  indebtedness, 
and  the  people  of  the  island  had  been  brought 
face  to  face  with  national  bankruptcy. 

In  this  posture  of  affairs  the  creditors  of 
the  nation,  who  were  for  the  greater  part 
Europeans,  had  become  clamorous  for  the 


37 


payment  of  arrears  of  interest  and  for  the 
enforcement  of  the  pledges  of  the  revenues 
of  the  various  ports  of  the  country,  which 
pledges  it  had  been  found  necessary  to  vio- 
late if  funds  were  to  be  had  for  the  Gen- 
eral Government.  Protocols  of  the  settle- 
ment of  the  various  debts  had  been  signed 
with  Germany,  Spain,  and  Italy  two  years 
previously  with  the  terms  of  which  it  had 
been  impossible  for  the  Dominican  Re- 
public to  comply,  and  the  creditors  had 
decided  to  invoke  the  aid  of  their  Gov- 
ernments in  the  collection  of  what  they 
claimed  to  be  their  due.  An  Italian  war- 
ship was  actually  dispatched  to  Domini- 
can waters  for  the  enforcement  of  the  agree- 
ments with  Italian  subjects.  The  Monroe 
Doctrine,  indeed,  seemed  menaced  and  the 
Dominican  Government  appealed  to  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  for  assist- 
ance in  its  extremity. 


38 


This  appeal  for  assistance  led,  as  you 
know,  to  a  plan  of  adjustment  whereby  the 
customhouses  of  the  Republic  were  to  be 
placed  in  the  hands  of  American  officials 
and  a  portion  of  the  receipts  thereof  was  to 
be  held  on  deposit  in  New  York  for  the 
benefit  of  all  creditors  alike.  It  is  also  a 
matter  of  history  that  subsequently  an  equi- 
table adjustment  was  had  with  the  creditors, 
the  debt  was  refunded,  and  a  convention 
between  this  Government  and  that  of  the 
Dominican  Republic  was  negotiated  where- 
by the  collection  and  administration  of  the 
customs  revenues  of  the  Republic  were  placed 
in  the  hands  of  American  officials,  who  were 
to  receive  from  the  United  States  "such  pro- 
tection as  it  may  find  to  be  requisite. 
An  adequate  provision  for  the  service  of  the 
debt  was  made,  and  a  new  order  of  things 
thus  began  and  has  continued  ever  since. 

The  result,  of  the  operations  of  this  ar- 


39 


rangement  has  been  that  the  creditors  now 
punctually  receive  their  interest,  and  there 
is  at  present  turned  over  to  the  Dominican 
Government  for  the  purposes  of  defraying 
its  current  expenses  an  amount  far  in  excess 
of  what  the  total  revenues  of  the  Republic 
had  previously  been.  Since  the  American 
management  of  the  customs  has  existed  it 
has  been  found  possible  to  reduce  the  im- 
port tariff  by  approximately  one-half,  not- 
withstanding which  the  import  duties  have 
increased  from  one  million  eight  hundred 
thousand  dollars  in  1  904  to  over  three  mil- 
lion three  hundred  thousand  in  1911,  while 
the  total  foreign  trade  of  the  Republic  has 
grown  from  about  six  millions  to  over  seven- 
teen millions  of  dollars  in  the  same  period, 
and  the  annual  harvest  of  revolutions  is  no 
longer  gathered  and  military  expenses  which 
formerly  depleted  the  treasury  have  been 
reduced  to  a  minimum. 

40 


The  problem  presented  by  affairs  in  the 
Dominican  Republic  in  1  904  has  now  be- 
come a  reality  in  Honduras  and  Nicaragua, 
and  those  Republics  have  sought  the  inter- 
position of  the  United  States. 

The  situation  is,  briefly,  this: 

Practically  from  the  outset  the  Republics 
of  Central  America,  especially  Honduras 
and  Nicaragua,  have  been  often  torn  with 
internal  dissension  and  overrun  with  revolu- 
tions. In  Honduras  and  Nicaragua  these  ills 
are  still  prevalent.  Beset  with  strife  these 
less  fortunate  Republics,  although  endowed 
by  Providence  with  vast  natural  resources, 
have  never  been  permitted  to  progress  to- 
wards a  normal  and  economic  development. 
Early  in  their  existence  as  independent 
States  they  found  their  treasuries  depleted 
and  their  resources  squandered  in  futile 
attempts  to  suppress  internal  disorder,  and  as 
a  natural  result  they  have  been  continuously 


41 


compelled  to  borrow  at  exorbitant  rates  of 
interest  from  those  willing  to  incur  the  dis- 
proportionate risk  of  lending  them  the 
moneys  necessary  for  the  temporary  conduct 
of  government,  with  the  result  that  they 
now  find  themselves  hopelessly  entangled  in 
the  mesh  of  enormous  and  rapidly  increasing 
national  indebtedness.  Their  revenues  have 
never  been  properly  applied  so  as  to  meet 
the  ever-increasing  demands  of  their  national 
creditors. 

Because  of  the  difficulty  of  communica- 
tion in  these  countries  the  customhouses  have 
ever  been  the  objective  point  of  the  revolu- 
tionists and  successive  contests  for  their 
control  have  marked  the  national  existence. 
Once  having  lost  control  of  the  customhouses 
and  the  revenues  derived  therefrom,  the  con- 
stituted authorities  have  found  themselves 
confronted  with  a  lack  of  funds  and  have 
ultimately  been  deprived  of  the  means  nec- 
essary to  defend  the  capitals. 

42 


Control  of  the  customhouses  once  ob- 
tained, it  becomes  necessary  for  the  success- 
ful revolutionists  to  expend  enormous  sums, 
practically  the  entire  national  revenue,  in  the 
maintenance  of  an  army  adequate  to  continue 
them  in  control.  Under  such  circumstances 
the  payment  of  the  interest  on  the  national 
debt  has  been  out  of  the  question,  and  such 
governments  fall  into  a  state  of  hopeless 
default  which  deprives  them  of  any  further 
foreign  credit. 

Honduras  and  Nicaragua  alike  occupy  a 
central  position  stretching  from  the  Carib- 
bean to  the  Pacific  and  separating  the  other 
Central  American  Republics.  In  Central 
America  there  are  many  rivalries  as  between 
the  heads  of  the  five  Republics,  but  there 
has  seldom  been  an  open  breach  between 
them  which  has  resulted  in  an  international 
war.  Rather  than  seek  a  direct  means  of 
redressing  their  grievances  it  has  been  found 


43 


far  more  effective  and  less  dangerous  than 
open  hostility  for  the  president  seeking  to 
injure  his  neighbor  to  institute  and  set  on 
foot  a  revolution  of  political  malcontents 
against  the  government.  For  years  the 
revolutions  and  internal  commotions  of  sev- 
eral of  these  republics  have  been  caused  by 
their  neighbors  who  have  taken  advantage  of 
their  position  to  harbor  political  refugees 
from  their  neighbors  and  aid  or  permit  them 
to  foster  a  hostile  movement  against  their 
native  republic,  which  is  fomented  in  se- 
curity without  the  borders  of  the  country  at 
whose  government  it  is  aimed,  and  which  is 
then  permitted  to  cross  the  international  line 
at  some  convenient  location,  thence  to  con- 
tend for  supremacy. 

Honduras,  because  it  borders  on  three 
of  the  other  Republics,  Guatemala,  Salva- 
dor, and  Nicaragua,  has  for  years  been  the 
hotbed  of  most  of  the  internal  disturbances 

44 


of  its  neighbors,  and  in  fact  has  been 
the  cockpit  of  Central  America.  So  great 
has  been  the  abuse  of  the  undefended  central 
position  occupied  by  Honduras  that  as  long 
ago  as  1 907  all  the  Republics  of  Central 
America  joined  in  a  peace  conference  and 
signed  at  Washington,  under  our  auspices,  a 
convention  one  article  of  which  had  for  an 
object  the  neutralization  of  the  territory  of 
that  Republic  so  as  to  prevent  its  further  use 
as  a  center  of  disturbance. 

Under  such  conditions  the  Republics  of 
Honduras  and  Nicaragua  came  to  seek  the 
counsel  and  assistance  of  the  United  States. 

Provided  the  enormous  waste  on  military 
establishments  could  be  checked,  the  customs 
revenues  of  both  these  countries,  properly 
administered,  should  be  ample  to  meet  the 
interest  and  sinking  fund  on  their  just 
national  obligations,  and  it  is  in  order  to 
establish  a  system  for  the  accomplishment  of 


45 


this  end  that  the  present  conventions  have 
been  framed. 

It  may  be  asked,  What  are  the  provisions 
of  the  two  practically  identical  treaties  as 
drawn  for  the  purpose  of  curing  the  evils  of 
the  situation  as  already  set  forth? 

The  preambles  of  the  two  conventions 
point  to  the  recognized  and  urgent  necessity, 
in  each  case,  of  laying  the  foundation  for 
more  effective  helpfulness  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  in  assisting  the  Republics  of 
Nicaragua  and  Honduras  to  the  rehabilitation 
of  their  respective  finances  and  in  thus 
making  possible  the  maintenance  of  peace 
and  prosperity  in  the  two  countries,  and  they 

* 

recite  the  fact  that  the  active  aid  of  this 
Government  has  been  requested  to  this  end. 
Then  follow  the  four  articles  of  the  conven- 
tions. These  include  some  eight  points 
and  I  shall  try  briefly  to  epitomize  them, 
roughly  indicating  the  objects  of  the  different 
provisions. 

46 


In  order  to  avoid  the  danger  of  further 
embarrassment  with  foreign  creditors,  the 
conventions  provide  (first)  that  a  loan  shall 
be  placed  in  the  United  States;  in  order  to 
provide  that  the  bankers'  contracts,  which  it 
will  be  necessary  to  negotiate  to  work  out 
the  details  of  their  financial  problems,  may 
be  equitable  and  just,  and  also  that  they  may 
be  properly  executed,  it  is  provided  (second) 
that  the  Signatory  Governments  shall  take 
due  note  of  the  terms  and  shall  consult  in 
case  of  any  difficulties.  That  the  loan 
may  be  properly  secured,  the  conventions 
stipulate  (third)  that  the  customs  duties 
shall  be  pledged;  that  this  security  may 
be  adequate  and  may  not  be  interfered 
with,  it  is  agreed  (fourth)  that  the  cus- 
toms duties  shall  not  be  changed  without  the 
consent  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States.  To  assure  the  proper  collection  and 
administration  of  the  customs  by  a  competent 


47 


person,  it  is  provided  (fifth)  that  a  receiver- 
general  of  customs  shall  be  appointed  by  the 
Government  of  the  country  concerned  from  a 
list  of  names  prepared  by  the  fiscal  agent  of 
the  contemplated  loan  and  approved  by 
the  President  of  the  United  States.  To 
insure  the  proper  discharge  of  the  duties  of 
the  receiver-general  of  customs,  it  is  agreed 
(sixth)  that  he  shall  be  under  obligation  to 
report  annually,  and  upon  request,  to  both 
parties  to  the  conventions.  In  order  that  he 
may  effectively,  conscientiously,  and  inde- 
pendently perform  his  functions,  and  to  pre- 
vent customs  houses  continuing  to  be  the 
goal  of  revolutionists,  it  is  stipulated  (seventh) 
that  the  Government  of  the  country  con- 
cerned will  protect  him,  and  (eighth)  that 
the  Government  of  the  United  States 
shall  afford  him  such  protection  as  it  may 
deem  requisite,  there  being  thus  obtained 
just  so  much  assurance  of  stable  conditions 


48 


and  proper  customs  collections  as  will  enable 
Nicaragua  and  Honduras  to  borrow  the 
money  necessary  to  rehabilitate  their  national 
finances  at  anything  like  a  reasonable  rate  of 
interest. 

I  wish  to  call  especial  attention  to  the 
fact  that  in  the  Dominican  Republic  just  this 
potential  safeguard,  unexercised  and  with- 
out any  undue  interference  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States,  has  cured  almost  century-old 
evils,  and  to  ask  you  to  judge  these  conven- 
tions in  the  light  of  the  plain  facts. 

There  has  been  a  good  deal  of  confusion 
of  ideas  in  regard  to  the  relation  of  the  con- 
ventions to  banking  arrangements  for  the 
rehabilitation  of  Honduran  and  Nicaraguan 
finances.  The  conventions  themselves  are 
quite  separate  from  any  bankers'  contracts. 
They  may  be  ratified  and  put  in  force  as 
between  the  Governments  concerned,  but 
they  remain  purely  potential  unless  and  until 


49 


bankers*  contracts  are  negotiated  which  are 
deemed  acceptable  by  both  Governments, 
and,  in  the  case  of  the  Governments  of 
Nicaragua  and  Honduras,  which  would  be 
direct  parties  to  the  contracts,  approved  by 
their  legislative  assemblies.  The  sole  desire 
of  the  Department  of  State  has  been  that 
Nicaragua  and  Honduras  make  the  best  con- 
tracts that  are  possible  under  the  conditions 
and  it  is  gratifying  that  American  bankers 
have  been  able  to  undertake  the  business. 

The  Government  of  Nicaragua  has 
already  approved  the  convention  and,  to 
relieve  its  urgent  and  pressing  necessities,  has 
placed  a  preliminary  loan  in  the  United 
States  and  engaged  American  citizens — one 
as  financial  adviser,  two  as  claims  commis- 
sioners, one  as  collector-general  of  customs, 
and  one  as  assistant  collector-general  of 
customs — and  in  this  way  has  laid  a  founda- 
tion for  its  financial  regeneration.  This, 


50 


however,  is  merely  a  temporary  expedient, 
and  what  has  been  done  must  be  lost  and 
the  bright  prospect  destroyed  unless  the  con- 
vention, upon  which  the  future  important  and 
permanent  improvements  depend,  is  ratified 
by  the  United  States. 

If  these  conventions  are  put  into  opera- 
tion what  has  happened  in  the  Dominican 
Republic  will  be  repeated  in  the  Republics 
of  Nicaragua  and  Honduras,  which  are  the 
key  to  the  peace  of  the  whole  of  Central 
America,  and  within  a  few  years  the  revolu- 
tions which  keep  these  countries  in  a  state 
of  constant  unrest  will  be  eliminated;  the 
neutrality  of  Honduras  and  Nicaragua  in 
Central  American  affairs  will  become  an 
accomplished  fact;  and  the  peace  of  the  rest 
of  Central  America  will  be  immensely 
strengthened. 

These  conventions,  as  I  have  said,  are  not 
a  new  experiment;  in  principle  they  have 


51 


been  tried  and  it  has  been  found  that  they 
produce  results  beneficial  to  the  debtor  and 
creditor  alike.  Instead  of  producing  foreign 
entanglements  they  have  precisely  the  oppo- 
site effect  because  they  do  away  with  the 
present  discontent  and  clamor  of  foreign 
creditors,  because  they  insure  prosperity,  and 
because  they  make  for  peace. 

Alone,  these  countries  find  it  impossible 
to  extricate  themselves  from  the  thraldom  of 
civil  strife,  and  they  quite  naturally  look  to 
their  more  prosperous  and  powerful  neighbor 
for  aid  and  guidance.  Shall  we  refuse  it  any 
more  than  we  refused  to  heed  the  cry  of  Cuba 
or  that  of  the  Dominican  Republic? 

With  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  a  tenet  of 
our  national  faith  can  we  refuse  to  these 
Republics  that  measure  of  assistance  which 
will  render  their  Governments  stable  and  keep 
them  from  foreign  interference?  These  are 
the  questions  involved  in  these  treaties  which 


52 


are  now  pending   before  the  United  States 
Senate. 

The  adoption  of  the  present  conventions 
is  counseled  not  only  by  the  humanitarian 
motive  of  preventing  useless  bloodshed  (hun- 
dreds of  lives  having  already  been  saved  by 
the  Dominican  arrangement)  and  by  the 
ever-increasing  important  political  reason  of 
avoiding  the  danger  of  European  entangle- 
ment in  the  affairs  of  the  countries  surround- 
ing the  Caribbean,  but  is  also  more  than 
justified  from  a  purely  material  standpoint. 
In  1  909  the  total  foreign  trade  of  the  Cen- 
tral American  States,  including  Panama, 
amounted  to  approximately  $60,000,000,  of 
which  about  one-half  was  with  the  United 
States.  When  we  consider  that  the  total  com- 
merce between  Mexico  and  the  United  States 
is  in  the  neighborhood  of  $1  1  7,000,000  we 
can  realize  in  some  degree  the  trade  possi- 
bilities with  the  Isthmian  Republics,  especially 


53 


if  it  be  understood  that  under  the  arrange- 
ment between  the  United  States  and  the 
Dominican  Republic  the  trade  with  that 
country  has  increased  since  1 903  (prior  to 
the  installation  of  American  officials  in  the 
customhouses),  when  it  was  somewhat  over 
$4,000,000,  to  about  $1  1 ,500,000  for  the 
year  1910,  and  that  the  share  of  the  United 
States  in  the  total  foreign  commerce  of  the 
Dominican  Republic  has  materially  increased 
in  the  same  period. 

Several  of  the  republics  of  South  Amer- 
ica have  grown  great  and  powerful  and 
enjoy  the  highest  culture,  fine  political  ideals, 
and  stable  governments.  These  republics, 
indeed,  are,  consciously  or  unconsciously, 
fellow  sponsors  with  the  United  States  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  a  Pan-American 
idea  as  well  as  an  American  policy.  The 
growth  of  such  nations  lightens  our  responsi- 
bility. The  logic  of  political  geography  and 


54 


of  strategy  and  now  our  tremendous  national 
interest  created  by  the  Panama  Canal  make 
the  safety,  the  peace,  and  the  prosperity  of 
Central  America  and  the  zone  of  the  Carib- 
bean of  paramount  interest  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States.  Thus,  the 
malady  of  revolutions  and  financial  collapse 
is  most  acute  precisely  in  the  region  where 
it  is  most  dangerous  to  us.  It  is  here  that 
we  seek  to  apply  a  remedy. 

It  would  not  be  sane  to  uphold  a  great 
policy  like  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  to  re- 
pudiate its  necessary  corollaries  and  neglect 
the  sensible  measures  which  reason  dictates 
as  its  safeguards. 

As  practical  measures  of  peace,  as  wise 
measures  of  policy,  as  useful  instrumentalities 
for  commercial  expansion  I  firmly  believe 
that  the  Nicaragua  and  Honduras  con- 
ventions will  commend  themselves  to  all 
thoughtful  American  citizens. 


55 


